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TEMPERED ZEAL: A COLUMBIA LAW PROFESSOR'S YEAR ON THE
STREETS WITH THE NEW YoRK CITY POLICE. By H. Richard Uvil-

ler. Chicago: Contemporary Books. 1988. Pp. xix, 234. $19.95.
There was a stickup team doing hotels in the Bronx. They would
come in, show a badge and say they were cops, and then hold up the
place.... Well, we had a description of their car, and one night we saw
it and pulled them over. We told them to get out of the car. One of the
guys is standing only about four feet away from me and he says, "Hold
it, hold it! I'm on the Job!" He reaches into his pocket, and I think he's
going for the Shield. He pulls out a gun and starts firing at me. I shoot
back. We both miss....
There were a lot of shots fired that night. I still remember, I could
see the bullets coming out of the guns. You really can see these little red
streaks.... This was a crowded 'street, too ... children playing and
everything. And thank God, the only person who got hit was one of the
bad guys. 1
Tempered Zeal's gritty, anecdotal style makes for quick and engrossing reading. The book describes. the experiences of H. Richard
Uviller, a Columbia law professor who spent his sabbatical leave accompanying New York City police officers on their rounds. Uviller
captures the flavor of the street cop's experience by interspersing their
stories with his own observations.
Uviller begins with the well-worn proposition that those individuals who have the most direct impact on the creation of criminal law
are often far removed from those who must apply the law in practice.
To the average cop on the street, the legal scholar, judge, and even
prosecutor seem light-years away. Tempered Zeal is Uviller's attempt
to bridge the gap between the law on the books and the law on the
streets. Although Uviller is successful in communicating the emotional atmosphere that permeates a cop's life, his attempt to integrate
academia with the stationhouse ultimately falls short.
Uviller, a former district attorney, had been teaching courses in
law enforcement and constitutional law for fourteen years when he
became troubled by what he perceived as his lack of familiarity with
the way criminal law operates in practice. As he describes it, "I realized I no longer knew how the [Supreme] Court's message sounded in
the stationhouse and the squad car" (p. x). Accordingly, Uviller chose
to spend eight months of sabbatical leave with New York City's Ninth
Precinct Robbery Identification Program. Tempered Zeal is an amalgamation of his personal observations and perceptions as he accompa1. Pp. 67-68 (quoting New York City Police Officer Joe Dean).
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nied police officers on nearly every aspect of their work (which they
reverentially refer to as "the Job"). 2
The book vividly describes individual officers, their backgrounds
and motivations, their interaction with the public, and their frequent
frustration with the imperfections of the system. Uviller's perceptions
can be roughly divided into two types: observational axioms about
modes of police behavior, and analyses of specific constitutional commands as applied in practice.
One of Uviller's more startling axioms concerns police officers'
views of their own discretion. Uviller asserts that police officers in
most cases tend to overestimate the institutional restraints placed upon
their authority (p. 79), noting various instances in which police officers
refrain from doing all that the law permits. For example, Ninth Precinct officers generally required that witness identifications from a
lineup be ninety-percent certain, a higher standard than is necessary
under the legal probable cause standard (pp. 78-80). Similarly, Uviller
describes an officer's unwillingness to use false statements to obtain a
confession, despite Uviller's questionable assurances that this would be
perfectly constitutional. 3
Another, perhaps less startling axiom involves the "confident misunderstanding of ministerial rules" - the stubborn adherence to a
mechanical routine or procedural "rule" in the mistaken belief that it
is constitutionally or statutorily required (p. 99). By way of illustration, Uviller describes the precinct's almost comically persistent belief
in the "two-hour/two-mile rule" (pp. 107;.09). Uviller had protested
at the officers' use of a "show-up" (a one-on-one exposure of suspect to
victim for identification) instead of a regular line-up. The officers assured Uviller that because the show-up took place within two hours
and two miles of the crime, its use was permissible, notwithstanding its
suggestiveness and the feasibility of a traditional line-up. 4 When
pressed to find the source of the rule, officers could only point to a
2. Uviller's methodology was rudimentary. Granted unlimited access by the New York City
police commissioner as a "civilian observer,'' his data consist of his own observations and the
experiences recounted to him by individual officers. Pp. xiv-xv.
3. Uviller does not offer any analytical or judicial support for his assurance to the officer.
Apparently, Uviller relies on the Miranda Court's failure to establish guidelines for police conduct after a suspect freely consents to talk to police. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966); Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 623 (6th. ed.
1986) ("the issue is still largely unresolved"); see also Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969)
(admitting a pre-Miranda confession despite misleading police suggestion); Oregon v. Mathiason,
429 U.S. 492 (1977) (interrogator's false statement to suspect irrelevant to issue of whether suspect was in custody such that Miranda warnings were required). However, a strong argument
can be made that forms of interrogation that "distort" or "vitiate" a suspect's Miranda warnings
should be prohibited. See, e.g., White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 581, 581-90, 599-600 (1979).
4. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (confrontation that is "unnecessarily suggestive" could deny a suspect due process oflaw); cf. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) (show-up
did not violate due process standards despite absence of exigent circumstances).
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dated departmental memo which stated that under unusual circumstances when a line-up is impracticable, one-on-one identification
could be used instead. Uviller's illustratfon soberly demonstrates how
good-faith police compliance with the wrong rule can cost the conviction of an apparently guilty suspect.
Although Uviller's observational maxims make interesting reading, his inability to target a specific audience prevents them from becoming much more than that. It is not clear whether Uviller is using
these maxims to dispel popular myths about law enforcement, to provide background material for legal scholars and lawmakers, to criticize
the workings of the criminal justice system, or merely to provide entertainment for the police aficionado. Uviller's lack of a focal audience
or purpose detracts from the overall impact of his anecdotes.
Moreover, the validity of Uviller's axioms in any broader sense is
open to question. Uviller's book is methodologically weak - his
"data" consist solely of his own impressions of one precinct in one
particular urban area. The reader is left wondering whether police
officers in other environments (such as a rural or suburban precinct, or
a different part of the country), or of different backgrounds (native
New Yorkers versus nonnatives, street cops versus detectives), would
function in the same way as the Ninth Precinct officers. The reader
may also wonder whether the officers' awareness of an outside observer caused them to alter their behavior, or to what extent Uviller's
own viewpoint affected his conclusions. 5
The legally trained reader will similarly question Uviller's analysis
of constitutional issues. Uviller's treatment of the law of police interrogation provides the most glaring example. Although Uviller devotes
a fairly substantial portion of his book to Miranda doctrine (three
chapters), he fails to say anything new or insightful about Miranda's
vitality. The first of these three chapters explores the value of obtaining a confession, emphasizing the usefulness of the confession as a
tool for obtaining other evidence of the crime (such as a weapon). Interestingly, Uviller downplays the value of a confession as accurate,
admissible evidence of guilt, possibly leading the lay reader to question
all the furor over the exclusionary rule.
The second of Uviller's chapters devoted to Miranda traces the
evolution of the doctrine, detailing the assumptions that underlie the
Supreme Court's decision. Uviller's position on confessions is some5. In the preface, Uviller describes his belief that the primary function of a criminal justice
system should be the separation of the guilty from the innocent; he states that he is "rather less
concerned than some of my colleagues with such questions as whether the suspect was accorded
his full Miranda warnings at precisely the appropriate time or whether he received the assistance
of counsel as he stood in a lineup." P. xiv. Uviller's own assertion that he was not unduly
influenced by his personal beliefs (p. xi) simply begs the question, however, and the loosely structured, anecdotal style of the book makes it difficult for the reader to judge whether Uviller
presents a biased view.
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what inconsistent: he sharply criticizes the Court's central assumption
that all interrogation is inherently coercive, yet seems to share the
Court's "unstated mistrust" of confessions as an evidentiary tool (p.
193). He hints that complete abolition of admissible confessions may
have been possible or desirable, but fails to make a cogent argument
that the Supreme Court should have done so. He concludes with a
healthy dose of skepticism about the effectiveness of the warnings
(again, nothing new), sarcastically referring to them as "ritual purges
of chimerical demons" (p. 197). Once more Uviller fails to use his
extensive observation of police behavior to suggest an efficacious
alternative.
The third chapter in Uviller's Miranda trilogy is ambitiously titled
"Miranda in the Field." Unfortunately, Uviller's treatment of the
daily workings of Miranda can only be described as a "cop-out." The
only facet of Miranda explored is the administration, or rather,
nonadministration, of the warnings in the squad car while a suspect is
being transported to the stationhouse. Again, Uviller's conclusions
are inconsistent. He first explains that the Ninth Precinct officers fail
to uniformly "Mirandize" suspects in the squad car for fear the warnings will deter suspects from talking. Yet a few pages later, he suggests that the prevailing view among police is that the Miranda
warnings "do not make a particle of difference" (p. 208).
Overall, the book's lack of substantive legal analysis is disappointing. Uviller provides many entertaining vignettes about New
York City cops, but adds little fresh commentary on the interplay of
the law with daily police practices. 6 Uviller fails to weave observation
and insight into a coherent whole; the result is no more than a series of
loosely related anecdotes relating to criminal procedure. 7
It is telling that what Tempered Zeal does not do can be described
more easily than what the book does. For example, Tempered Zeal is
not a treatise on criminal procedure, nor is it a detailed description of
· current police practice. It does not give a coherent overview of criminal or constitutional law. It is, rather, a chatty, anecdotal book which
illustrates criminal law more than interprets it. While this may be
appropriate for a reader unfamiliar with criminal procedure, the legally trained reader will find the book superficial and simplistic in its
treatment of such issues as search and seizure law or the rules of
evidence. 8
Moreover, Tempered Zeal is not a policy-oriented book. Uviller
6. For example, Uviller's discussion of Miranda contributes virtually nothing that a basic
criminal procedure course or hombook would not contain.
7. Uviller used his observations and anecdotes much more effectively in a recent article
describing the evidentiary use of "cognitive evidence." See Uviller, Evidence from the Mind of
the Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of the Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87
CoLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1141 n.11, 1142 n.14, 1170 n.121 (1987).
8. The reader may also wonder why Uviller felt it necessary to include certain anecdotes at
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focuses on the day-to-day operation of one precinct, and except for a
few hints, leaves the reader to draw her own conclusions about how
the criminal law should function. Furthermore, the book is not a sociological study of police methods. The reader who is searching for tables, variables, and data will be disappointed, as Uviller presents no
grand hypothesis or statistical analysis of clearance rates and such.9
Instead, Uviller presents "[a]necdote and description" - his own
brand of "impressionistic reporting" (p. xi). Although Uviller's weak
methodology is a major flaw, the book's vivid descriptions of ordinary
cops on the beat are the tradeoff.
Nevertheless, the reader who does not entertain any of these expectations may find something to think about in Tempered Zeal. For example, the reader hypnotized by the media's glamorous view of police
work may gain respect for its difficulty and insight into the imperfect
workings of law enforcement. The layperson may acquire a concise,
though spotty, briefing on some of the key issues in criminal law.
And, despite the lack of substantive legal analysis, the legal reader
may come to appreciate the cop-on-the-beat's struggle to balance aggressive crime-fighting and restrained integrity. Had Uviller been able
to tighten these strands with a sharper analysis, Tempered Zeal might
have yielded a more compelling result.
-

Carol J. Sulcoski

all, such as an. unduly detailed discussion as to whether a male or female officer should stripsearch a transvestite suspect. Pp. 105-06.
9. According to Uviller, "I resisted all temptations to formulate a theory to guide my investigation. I was determined to reverse the usual order of scholarship and let my conclusions, if any,
follow from my research.... Thinking about the criminal justice system means thinking about
judges and cops." P. xi; cf., e.g.• J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL (2d ed. 1975) (a classic
sociological study of police administration and practices).

